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Notes 
Discrimination In the Laws 
of Information Warfare 
As societies and economies increasingly rely on electronic 
telecommunications, they grow more vulnerable to threats from 
other computer systems. At the same time, states' military and 
intelligence organizations are increasingly developing the 
capability to attack and defend these assets. As with the 
introduction of earlier weapons systems, would-be users 
express the belief that the laws restraining warjare no longer 
apply. This Note seeks to explain the emerging relationship 
between electronic telecommunications and the laws of war. In 
particular, this Note seeks to show how the norm requiring the 
discrimination between military and civilian objectives may be 
retained in an era of long-distance wagare. Finally, itpresents 
a model protocol to guide warriors and lawyers in planning or 
judging the legitimacy of information operations. 
War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will . . . . 
Attached to force are certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly 
worth mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely 
weaken it.2 
-Carl von Clausewitz 
1. In 1995-1996, I served as aprofessorat the AirWar College, United States AirForce's 
senior service school. However, this Note is not directly informed by any classified 
information, nor does it represent anyone's opinions but my own. 
2. CARLVON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 75 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & transs., 
1976) (1832). Likewise, centuries before, Cicero claimed that inter arma silent leges (in war 
the law is silent). 
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War consists largely of acts that would be criminal ifperjormed in time of 
peace-killing, woundirrg, kidnapping, destroying o r  carrying off other 
peoples ' property. Such conduct is not regarded as criminal ifit takes place 
in the course of war, because the state of war lays a blanket of immunity 
over the warriors. But the area of immunity is not unlimited, and its 
boundaries are marked by  the laws of war.3 
-Telford Taylor 
As Telford Taylor noted, the laws of war distinguish soldiers, 
sailors, marines, airmen, and even spies from murderers, kidnappers, 
and arsonists. The distinction Taylor describes is inextricable from 
legal notions of war, a conclusion down-played or possibly 
misconstrued by strategist Carl von Clausewitz in the cited excerpt from 
his seminal treatise, On War? In reality, the laws of war have long 
restrained its legitimate conduct. These constraints include distinctions 
between campaign and non-campaign seasons: and they guide "the 
selection of methods, of weaponry and of  target^."^ They provide 
specific immunities for certain persons and places. They distinguish 
between combatants and noncombatants, between legitimate and 
illegitimate  target^.^ Over the millennia and particularly the past half- 
century, these rules have expanded and been codified in international 
law. Despite these remarkable advances, discrimination between 
legitimate and illegitimate weapons, methods, and targets has also 
eroded over the past half-century, as warfare expanded from limited set- 
piece encounters into virtually unlimited wars between multi-state 
alliances.* Even so, this critical norm of humanitarian law has survived. 
As the laws improved, the breaches became more stark. 
3. TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 19 (1 970). 
4. See Michael Howard, Introduction ~OTHELAWS OFWAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE 
IN THE WESTERN WORLD 2 (Michael Howard et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter LAWS OF WAR]. 
While the formal laws of war were less developed in the Napoleonic era than they are today, 
Howard notes that Clausewitz "knew very well . . . that the conduct of war was subject to 
considerably greater and more perceptible limitations in his own time than it had been in the 
days of, say, Genghis Khan." Id. 
5. Josiah Ober, Classical Greek Times, in LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 13-26. 
6. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 5 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 2d ed. 
1989) [hereinafter Roberts & Guela. 
7 .  For an introduction to the notion of the immunity of non-combatants, see Howard, 
Constraints on Walfare, in LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 3-1 1. Examples of this principle 
abound in history. See Robert Stacey, Age of Chivalry, in LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 29- 
3 1; Geoffrey Parker, Early Modem Europe, in LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 41,46; Gunther 
Rothenberg, The Age of Napoleon, in LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 87-97. 
8. For a description and analysis of the most horrifying example of the expansion of war, 
see David Alan Rosenberg, Nuclear War Planning, in LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 160; see 
also David Alan Rosenberg, The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons andAmerican Strategy, 
1945-1960,7 INT'LSECUWY (Spring 1983) at 3-71. 
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This Note analyzes some of the problems and suggests some 
guidelines for retaining the critical norm of discrimination in the era of 
long-distance, impersonal, and undeclared war in the information age. 
Part I introduces discrimination-the long-standing norm requiring that 
military planners and operators distinguish between legitimate military 
objectives and non-combatants. Part II grapples with the fast-changing 
subject of warfare in the information age. Part III tackles the problems 
of applying discrimination today. Discrimination faces many new 
challenges, but the traditional means for formulating solutions still offer 
valuable tools for finding legal and ethical constraints on the application 
of force via electronic media. Part IV provides a model protocol that 
acknowledges these international norms, formalizing them in 
international law. Finally, Part V offers a few concluding remarks. 
While states frequently engage in armed conflict: aggressive 
international war has been outlawed-f~st by the Kellogg-Briand Treaty 
(1928)1° and more efficaciously by the UN Charter (1945)." 
Nonetheless, "[tlhe application of the laws of war does not depend upon 
the recognition of the existence of a formal state of 'war,' but (with 
certain qualifications) comprehends situations of armed conflict and 
military occupation in general, whether formally recognized as 'war' or 
not."12 
Thus the tradition of the laws of war has evolved into the law of 
armed conflict (LOAC).13 Moreover, because the laws limiting a state's 
9. Themost interestinginquiry into theend of formal warmay ~~MARTINVANCREVELD, 
TRANSFORMATION OF WAR (1991). See also Paul Kennedy & George J. Andreopoulos, The 
Laws of War: Some Concluding Reflections, in LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 214-25. 
10. General Treaty For the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy 
("Kellogg-Briand Pact"), Aug. 27, 1928, T.S. No. 796. 
11. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4) ("All members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."), 51 
("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self- 
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . . ."). 
12. Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 1. 
13. For the transition from laws of war to LOAC, see Lt. Col. Marc L. Warren, 
Operational Law-A Concept Matures, 152 MIL. L. REV. 33,35 (1996) ("Military operations 
other than war present numerous and diverse legal issues."). The U.S. codification of LOAC 
began with the field manual Columbia Law School professor Francis Lieber wrote for the Union 
Army during the Civil War. See U.S. Army General Order No. 100, Instructions for the 
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (1863) (addressing legal issues about 
the treatment of the enemy without a declaration of war), available in THE AVALON PROJECT 
AT THE YALE LAW SCHOOL: DOCUMENTS IN LAW, HISTORY, AND DIPLOMACY, 
<http:l/www.yale.eduflawweblavalon/lieber.ht [hereinafter Lieber Code]. See LAWS OF 
WAR, supra note 4, at 6. General Order No. 100 has undergone significant revisions but 
remains the basic Field Manual of the U.S. Army. See Lieber Code, supra, at 100-05. 
"Although such national manuals also have a function in providing evidence of the law, they 
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entry into hostility are now governed by a variety of international laws 
that have replaced the just war tradition (jus ad bellum), this Note will 
concentrate on the jus in bello-restraints on the conduct of warfare.14 
II. INFORMATION WARFARE 
One of the most dynamic types of "armed conflict" is Information 
Warfare ("IW).15 Ironically, IW is neither 'armed' in the traditional 
sense, nor does it necessarily involve 'conflict.' Dramatic hypothetical 
accounts of IW abound and best serve to introduce this apparent 
paradox. Consider a few hypothetical situations. Special forces 
detonate a small non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse weapon (EMP) near 
an enemy nation's central bank computer storage facility, burning out 
the electronics that transact, communicate, and store the nation's 
financial information. Or, an intelligence operator hacks from his own 
country into another nation's telecommunications network, planting 
computer code that destroys the software running that system. Or, a 
military operator feeds into another state's television broadcast 
"morphed" images of that state's religious leader engaged in 
sacrilegious acts. Or, another operator hacks into a target nation's 
computer network coordinating air or rail traffic to reprogram the 
systems to shut down without warning.16 At the extreme, each of these 
hypothetical situations would lead to dramatic results: economies 
are in general bound to be viewed with some caution." Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 7. 
Today, the applicable law might preferably be called "international humanitarian law 
applicable in armed conflicts" or "Operational Law." For the former term, see International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference on the 
Reafirmation and Development of International Humanitarian h w  Applicable in Armed 
ConjZict (1977). The ICRC was founded at the 1863 Geneva International Conference "with 
the express purpose of reducing the horror of warfare." Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 8. 
For the latter term, "Operational Law," seeLt. Col. David E. Graham, Operationalhw: 
A Concept Comes ofAge, ARMY LAW., July 1987, at 9 ("that body of law, both domestic and 
international, impacting upon legal issues associated with the planning for and deployment of 
US Forces overseas in both peacetime and combat environments."); see also Warren, supra, at 
36. 
14. Roberts and Guelff note the "cardinal principle that jus in bello applies in cases of 
armed conflict whether the conflict is lawful or unlawful in its inception underjus ad bellum." 
Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 1. 
15. Douglas Waller, Onward Cyber Soldiers, TIME, Aug. 21, 1995, at 39 ('"information 
warfare'-now the hottest concept in the halls of the Pentagon"). 
16. These hypothetical situations are based directly on those in Waller, supra note 15,39- 
44. See also Lt. Col. Kurt C. Reitinger, New Tools for New Jobs, 124 PROC. U.S. NAVALINST. 
37 (Apr. 1998) (discussing the need for new doctrine to successfully employ new non-lethal 
military technology). See also Elaine Scany, The Fall of W A  800: The Possibility of 
Electromagnetic Zntetjerence, N. Y .  REV. BOOKS, Apr. 9, 1998. 
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would be destroyed; societies would disintegrate; planes and trains 
would crash. As a result, governments might fall. Thousands of people 
would likely perish. As dramatic as these hypotheticals are, IW may 
prove complicated and possibly even more devastating than these 
examples suggest.17 If subtle or carefully played, attacks might go 
undetected, and the target countries or organizations would not even 
know to protect themselves against follow-on attacks. For example, an 
air-traffic controller would wonder why his system crashed at such an 
inopportune moment. A banker would wonder about a million dollar 
discrepancy in a large transaction. IW7s potential impact ranges from 
the cataclysmic to the trivial. And yet, we have only begun to consider 
what it is and how it may be pursued. 
Definitions of this fast-changing and mostly classified set of 
capabilities and operations-IW-vary. Each of the U.S. military 
services is currently engaged in studying IW. Each has considerable 
experience and expertise in information operations of one variety or 
another.18 While their definitions do not vary significantly, this Note 
adopts that of the Air Force (USAF), which appears to be the lead 
agency. IW is any "action to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy the 
enemy's information and its functions; protecting ourselves against 
17. For context on jus ad bellum Gust war theory], see MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND 
UNJUST WARS, pt. 2, at 51-124 (1977). The most critical and difficultjus ad bellum issues for 
IW include: ljproblems of proof when a party suspects an informatio&sault; and 2) deciding 
when such an assault attains the level of an "armed attack" as required under U.N. CHARTER art. 
51, or "aggression" as defined by the U.N. General ~ssembly,-G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. 
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, art. 1, U.N. Doc. 119631 (1974). For a start, see George I. 
Seffers & Mark Walsh, Does a Cyber Attack Constitute War?, DEFENSENEWS, ept. 8,1997, 
at 1. 
A recent article does address some of the larger international legal implications. See 
Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warfare: New Challenges forpublic International Law, 37 HARV. 
INT'L L.J. 272 (1996) (arguing that successful resolution of international conflicts in the 
information age will require a new theoretical structure of law). 
18. For instance, the U.S. Army has long had the standing capability to engage in 
psychological operations such as those relying on broadcast reports or distributing pamphlets 
to encourage an enemy to retire from the field. See Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Gordon R. 
Sullivan & Col. James M. Dubik, War in the Information Age, 74 M I L  REV. 46 (July 1993), 
reprinted in 94-4 LANDPOWER ESSAYS SERIES (May, 1994). The Navy also has considerable 
expertise. See Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski &John J. Gartska, Network-Centric Warfare: 
Its Origin and Future, 124 PROC. U.S. NAVAL INST. 88 (Jan. 1998). The Air Force has an 
Information Warfare squadron at Shaw AFB, North Carolina. See Col Phillip A. Johnson, 
USAF, Associate Deputy General Counsel (IA), Office of the General Counsel, DOD, in 
Opening Shots: Information Warfare and the Law, brief to FY 98, US Air Force Judge 
AdvocateGeneral School, Legal Aspects of Information Operations Symposium, Maxwell AFB, 
Ala., app. F, Principal DoD Information Warfare Organizations, at F-33-34. The USAF also 
has an Information Warfare Center at Kelly, AFB, Texas. Information superiority is an official 
Air Force core competency, alongside such traditional concerns as rapid global mobility and 
precision engagement. See Global Engagement (visited Mar. 8, 1999) 
<www.af.miVcurrent/globaV>. 
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those actions; and exploiting our own military information function^."'^ 
It includes electronic warfare, military deception, physical destruction, 
security measures, and information attack.20 The Air Force defines 
information in this context as "data and instructions" and distinguishes 
IW from warfare in the information age generally, including in the 
former only those attempts to influence the information dire~tly.~' In 
19. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE (USAF), CORNERSTONES OFINFORMATION WARFARE 3-4 
(1995) [hereinafter CORNERSTONES]. See also OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, 
DEP'T OFTHE NAVY, OPNAVINST 3430.26, at 1 (Jan. 18., 1995) ("Information warfare is the 
action taken in support of national security strategy to seize and maintain a decisive advantage 
by attacking an adversary's information infrastructure through exploitation, denial, and 
influence, while protecting friendly information systems."). 
The literature on IW is small but growing and includes: THEINFORMATIONREVOLUTION 
AND NATIONAL SECURITY (Stuart J.D. Schwartzstein ed., 1996); WINN SCHWARTAU, 
INFORMATION WARFARE: CHAOS ON THE ELECTRONIC SUPERHIGHWAY (1994); NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL (NRC)'S SYSTEM SECURITY COMMITTEE, COMPUTERS AT RISK: SAFE 
COMPUTINGINTHEINFORMATIONAGE (1991); THEFIRSTINFORMATION WAR (Alan D. Campen 
ed., 1992); MANUELDELANDA, WAR INTHE AGE OFINTELLIGENTMACHINES (1991); KENNETH 
C. ALLARD, COMMAND, CONTROL, ANDTHE COMMONDEFENSE (1996); PAULSTRASSMANN,THE 
POLITICS OFINFORMATIONMANAGEMENT (1 995); MARTIN C. LIBICKI, THEMESH ANDTHE NET: 
SPECULATIONS ON ARMED CONFLICT IN A m E  O F m E  SILICON (1995); DAVID F. RONFELDT, 
CYBEROCRACY, CYBERSPACE, AND CYBEROLOGY: POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE INFORMATION 
REVOLUTION (1991); GERALD HUST, TAKING DOWN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1994); 
BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE: 21ST CENTURY WARFARE ISSUES (Bany R. Schneider & 
Lawrence E. Grinter eds., 1995); MARTINC. LIBI~KI, WHATIS INFORMATION WARFARE (1995). 
The periodical literatureincludes: John Arquilla &DavidRonfeldt, Cybenvaris Coming, 
12 COMP. STRATEGY 141 (Apr.-June 1993); Martin C. Libicki &James A. Hazlett, Do WeNeed 
an Information Corps?, JOINTFORCEQ. (Autumn 1993); P.C. Emmett, Sofhvare Warfare: The 
Emerging Future, ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INST. J. @ec. 1992); Mary Fitzgerald, Russian 
Views of Electronic Signals and Information Warfare, AM. INTELLIGENCE J. (Spring-Summer 
1994); John Rothrock, Information Warfare: Time for some Constructive Skepticism, AM. 
INTELLIGENCEJ. (Spring-Summer 1994); Craig Johnson, Information War-Not a Paper War, 
J. ELECTRONICDEF. (Aug. 1994); Chet Morris et al., Weapons ofMass Protection: Nonlethality, 
Information, Warfare, and Airpower in the Age of Chaos, in AIRPOWER J. (Spring 1995); 
George J. Stein, Information Warfare, in AIRPOWER J. (Spring 1995); Richard Szafranski, A 
Theory ofInformation Warfare: Preparing for2020, in AIRPoWERJ. 77 (Spring 1995); Richard 
Szafranski, When Waves Collide: Future Conflict, JOINT FORCE Q. (Spring 1995); Jim 
Anderson, Chugging up the Onramp of the Info Interstate, FOR. SERVICE J. (Mar. 1995); 
Defense Technology, ECONOMIST, June 10,1995, supp. 5-20; Donald E. Ryan, Implications of 
Information-Based Wagare, JOINT FORCE Q. (Autumn-Winter 1994-95); H.D. Arnold et al., 
Targeting Financial Systems as Centers of Gravity: 'Low Intensity' to 'No Intensity' Conflict, 
10 DEE ANALYSIS (1994); Spacecast 2020, Leveraging the Infosphere: Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance in 2020, AIRPOWER J. (Summer 1995). 
20. The USAF defines information attack as "[d]irectly corrupting information without 
visibly changing the physical entity within which it resides." CORNERSTONES, supra note 19, 
at 6. 
21. The information age is most famously explained by theTofflers. See ALVINTOFFLER 
& HEIDITOFFLER, WAR AND ANTI-WAR: SURVIVALATTHEDAWN OFTHE 21ST CENTURY (1 993) 
(the emerging knowledge-based society will useknowledge-based systems to conduct warfare). 
See also Mark R. Shulman, War and Anti-War, 121 PROC. U.S. NAVALINST. 84 (Oct. 1994) 
(book review). 
For an overview of information superiority, see Cebrowski & Gartska, supra note 18, at 
28-35; and Col. Owen D. Ryan &John J. Gartska, The Emerging Joint Strategy forInfonnation 
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addition to being defined, IW also needs to be placed within the broader 
context of military operations. 
IW operations potentially range across the entire spectrum of 
military capabilities. The traditional state-sponsored uses of force 
define the categories of conflict. Because the international system has 
effectively outlawed aggressive war, most cross-border conflicts are 
styled "self-defense" or "defen~ive."~~ At the most basic level, I 
distinguish between a military operation based on an "offensive 
defense" and one based on a "defensive defense."23 For example, the 
defensive can be offensive, as it was when the Allied Forces landed at 
Normandy in 1944 or in Kuwait and Iraq in 199 1 .24 These are offensive 
measures undertaken in collective self-defense. The defense was 
defensive when the Anglo-French forces attempted to keep the 
Wehrmacht from pushing them out of France in 1940 or when the UN 
Forces sent USAF F-15s to Saudi Arabia fifty years later to deter the 
Iraqi invasion. Strictly defensive or security operations include camp or 
perimeter defenses like sentries firing sidearms when they detect a 
perimeter breach. 
In IW, these distinctions also apply. Offensive defense IW 
operations might include: 1) active collection of intelligence about 
Superiority, US DOD, Joint Staff J-6, information briefing (visited Mar. 4, 1999) 
<http:llwww.dtic.mil/JCSlJ61eduUtr.html>. 
22. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (nothing "shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense"). 
23. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, coastal defense boats and fortresses 
provided the United States with defensive defense. As they evolved in the 1880s and 1890s, 
battleships provided a new offensive defense, defending the nation instead by threatening to 
bring the battle to the enemy. Strictly defensive measures were never abandoned; if a spy 
attempted to destroy a naval vessel in a U.S. harbor, he would have been arrested or killed. See 
MARK RUSSELL SHULMAN, NAVALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN SEA POWER, 1882- 
1893, at 1-2 (1995). For a graphic explanation of these types of warfare, see id.; see also infra, 
Appendix 11. 
24. There are potential military applications for information operations that are neither 
offensive nor defensive. Consider, for instance, the use of radio jamming when Hutu extremists 
are broadcasting "lists of enemies to be hunted down and butchered." Jamie Frederic Metzl, 
Information Intervention, FOREIGNAFF. 15-20 (Nov.lDec. 1997). Formore extensive treatment, 
see also Jamie Frederic Metzl, Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of Radio 
Jamming, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 628 (1997) (proposing "a narrow exception to the general 
international standard supporting the free flow of information . . . for clear cases of incitement 
to genocide where the occurrence of that genocide appears imminent" or for cases of mass 
human rights abuse). For a comprehensive program, see CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON 
P R E V E ~ G  DEADLY CONFLICT, ~ A L R E P O R T :  PREVENTING DEADLY COWCT (1997). See 
also Warren, supra note 13, at 34-37; Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3-07 (1995) (visited Mar. 24, 1999) 
~www.dtic.mil/doctrineJjeYC_pubs2.htm. 
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information systems;25 2) unauthorized intrusions into information 
systems; 3) introduction of vulnerabilities into information systems; 4) 
corruption or denial of data; and 5) disabling or destroying information 
systems.26 These are sometimes referred to as "information operations." 
United States law requires that the armed forces and intelligence 
services of the United States undertake this type of operation only 
against particular foreign opponents under executive order, presumably 
as part of a coordinated national policy to implement unilateral or 
multilateral defensive  operation^.^^ 
The legal issues of offensive information operations have never 
been brought before U.S. courts. The military and intelligence agencies, 
however, would likely be authorized to undertake them when ordered 
by the Executive. This law has not yet been pled or decided, but it 
seems like a small step from traditional forms of covert action to the 
types of net-centric IW considered in this Note.2s The Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) are 
granted general authority to undertake covert action at the direction of 
the National Security Council.29 The breadth of this authority was 
clarified by Executive Order No. 12,333, which provides in part: 
No agency except the CIA (or the Armed Forces of the United 
States in time of war declared by Congress or during any period 
25. Active collection includes such measures as infiltrating another country's computer 
systems, either by sitting down in front of its dedicated terminals or via telecommunications 
systems from a distance. Compare this with passive gathering, which includes such measures 
as intercepting broadcasted communications. 
26. This list is suggested by Col Phillip A. Johnson. See Johnson, supra note 18. Another 
more comprehensive list proposes that offensive defense operations could include: 
"psychological operations, military deception, jamming of enemy information systems, signal 
intelligence (SIGINT), and attacks on enemy information systems by physical destruction or by 
electronic means." OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, HEADQUARTERS UNITED 
STATE~AIRFORCE,P~ERONLEGALISSUESININFORMATIONOPERATIONS 13-14 (3d ed., draft, 
Oct. 1997) [hereinafter PRIMER]. Note that both lists come from the USAF indicating an ever- 
changing reality. 
27. For a more complete discussion of the war powers, see Louis Henkin, The Use of 
Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in LOUIS HENKIN ET AL, RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONALLAW 
ANDTHEUSEOFFORCE 37-69 (2d ed. 1991). For operations conducted by intelligence services, 
see ROY GODSON, DIRTY TRICKS OR TRUMP CARDS: U.S. COVERT ACTION AND 
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (1995); W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING 
COVERT A ~ o N :  P R A ~ C E S ,  CONTEXTS, AND POLICIES OF COVERT COERCION ABROAD IN 
INTERNATIONALAND MERICANLAW (1992); Robert F. Turner, Coercive CourtAction and the 
Law Regulating Covert Action, 20 YALE J. INT'LL. 427 (1995) (book review). 
28. For more in this volume on this concept and its legal implications, see Michael N. 
Schmitt, Computer Network Attach and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts on 
a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 885 (1999). 
29. National Security Act of 1947,50 U.S.C. $0 403,413 (1982); Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 3 662,22 U.S.C. 5 2422 (1988). 
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covered by a report from the President to the Congress under 
the War Powers Resolution (87 Stat. 855)) may conduct any 
special activity unless the President determines that another 
agency is more likely to achieve a particular ~bjective.~' 
Michael Reisman and James Baker conclude that the "unless" clause 
"effectively leaves the matter up to the Pre~ident."~~ 
As with the more traditional forms of covert action, particular IW 
operations are constrained by LOAC as well as the requirement for 
executive auth~rization.~~ As with all operations, the choice of tool or 
weapon is critical for the legality of the operation. While the effects of 
many of these operations could be achieved with conventional arms, this 
Note concentrates on those undertaken via the electronic 
telecommunications media. Dropping an explosive on a computer 
server or a hydroelectric dam, using a laser to destroy a telephone line, 
or using a directed electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) to disrupt a satellite's 
operations have enough similarity to conventional warfare that the 
traditional LOAC would still apply. While not simple, these scenarios 
do not present new categories of challenges like the type under analysis 
here. This Note concentrates on information attacks, those that seek to 
alter Lcinformation without visibly changing the physical entity within 
which it arises."33 Rather than explosives, lasers, or directed EMP's, it 
30. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 1.8(e), 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (1981) (emphasis added). 
Section l.ll(c) also provides that the secretary of defense shall "[c]onduct programs and 
missions necessary to fulfill national, departmental, and tactical foreign intelligence 
requirements." 
31. REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 27, at 119. At the time of publication, Baker was an 
Attorney Advisor in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of State. He should not be 
confused with then Secretary of State James A. Baker 111. 
32. Theserestraints now include, most famously and substantively, a ban on assassination. 
This ban presents an irony by barring excessive discrimination. President Gerald Ford issued 
' 
an executive order to ban U.S. intelligence officers from "engag[ing] in, or conspir[ing] to 
engage in, political assassination." United States Foreign Intelligence Activities, Exec. Order 
No. 1 1,905, $5(g), 41 Fed. Reg. 7,733 (1976). President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 
No. 12,036,s 2-305,43 Fed. Reg. 3687 (1978); and President Ronald Reagan issued Executive 
Order No. 12,333, $ 2.11, 48 Fed. Reg. 59,947 (1981). See ABRAM N. SHULSKY, SILENT 
WARFARE: UNDERSTANDINGTHEWORU)OFINTELLIGENCE 100-101 (Gary J. Schmitt ed., 2d ed. 
1993). 
The debate, however, is not over. See REISMAN &BAKER, supra note 27, at 71; Robert 
F. Turner, Commentary & Opinion, Killing Saddam: Would it Be A Crime?, WASH. POST, Oct. 
7,1990, at Dl; Lt. Cmdr. Bmce A. Ross, The Case for Targeting Leadership in War, 46 NAVAL 
WAR C. REV. 73 (Winter 1993); George Stephanopoulos, Why We Should Kill Saddam, 
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1, 1997, at 34. Turner, Ross, and Stephanopoulos argue that the ban forces 
the U.S. to invade a country like Panama (or potentially Iraq) at great risk and cost rather than 
effecting a more efficient solution. 
33. PRIMER, supra note 26, at 14. 
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analyzes the use of such weapons as electronic viruses, worms, and 
logic bombs. They can be inserted remotely via various media of 
electronic communications: telephone, radio, or Internet. Alternatively, 
like a clipper chip, they can be embedded in the software of electronic 
machinery manufactured in the United States and sold abroad.34 Then 
they could be triggered remotely by telephone, radio, or other electronic 
means. These weapons might also be used against the United States, its 
resources, people, or infrastructure. 
If a non-U.S. party (whether state, group, or individual) assaults or 
attempts to assault a U.S. information system, numerous possible 
responses exist. As with other armed conflict, defensive IW operations 
are subject to the restraints of LOAC and its principle of proportionality. 
The traditional laws of armed conflict provide a starting point for the 
application of proportionality. Any U.S. response to an attack should 
be intended to have an effect of inflicting roughly the same scale of 
harm as was intended in the initial assault. Under general LOAC 
principles, the defender should attempt to focus the retaliation against 
only the source of the initial assault (or attempt). Application of this 
general rule is relatively simple when air defense interceptors or 
missiles simply shoot down intruder reconnaissance planes after a failed 
attempt to warn them off. The defender does not destroy the intruder's 
air force. It is equally straightforward when anavy destroyer returns fire 
and sinks an attacking gunboat but not its entire, far-off fleet. IW 
complicates the equation, because the attacker may not be a single, 
readily identified individual. 
In a conventional assault, the defender knows precisely who is 
attacking, e.g., the reconnaissance plane or the gunboat. He may not 
know its nationality, but he will usually know which people are directly 
engaged in the assault. In IW, an assault will likely be camouflaged. 
The assailant will probably route her assault through an innocent 
intermediary telecommunications systems. For example, a hacker 
would first route her communications through various servers around 
the world before attempting to gain access to a DOD computer system. 
In such a situation, too hasty a defender might destroy the innocent 
intermediate system(s) in his effort to thwart and punish the attacker. 
34. A clipper chip is the proposed electronic processor that would allow authorized key- 
holders to decrypt an encrypted transmission, one in which mathematical algorithms are used 
to "scramble data to protect its confidentiality." Scott Charney & Kent Alexander, Computer 
Crime, 45 EMORY L. J. 931,957 n.27 (1996). In theory the chip could be added to a machine 
built almost anywhere by anyone, but it would likely be simpler to add to machines 
manufactured in the United States. 
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A second major distinction between IW and conventional warfare 
is that in a conventional assault, the gravity of the threat is relatively 
unambiguous. Thus, we know that areconnaissance plane could collect 
sensitive information and that a gunboat could sink a cruiser. An 
electronic assault, however, might merely amount to the hapless 
intrusion of an American teen-age hacker:' for example, or it might be 
7 36 part of a Hezbollah strategy to degrade CENTCOM s command and 
control functions in preparation for a coordinated large-scale terrorist 
attack upon Israel. In fact, during the months leading up to the Gulf 
War, private Dutch hackers actually pillaged DOD computer sites and 
subsequently offered information about UN troops' strength, 
capabilities, and positions to Iraqi  leader^?^ Had Iraqi president 
Saddam Hussein availed himself of this information, thousands more 
people on both sides might have died. 
The DOD7s computers will be subject to approximately 14,000 hack 
attacks this year?* Despite the potential gravity of the threat, active 
responses must be made carefully-not automatically. An operator 
should evaluate the situation, decide if there has indeed been an attack 
and what the appropriate response should be. He assures some level of 
protection for harmless trespassers (children or those entering by 
mistake). "Any decision to use active defense system ought to be based, 
among other factors, on available information about the intruder's skill, 
status, and apparent  intention^."^^ These active defense systems can 
destroy the computers or systems used to launch the assault, or they may 
35. Some American teenagers pose relatively serious threats, but they are subject to 
criminal law and retain constitutional protections. See, e.g., United States v. Moms, 928 F.2d 
504 (2d Cir. 1991) (young American hacker inserted a worm-a self-contained computer 
program-into various computers via the Internet that crippled 6,200 computers and caused 
nearly 100 million dollars in damage). Alternatively, an apparently harmless hacker might be 
in the employ of an unfriendly foreign intelligence service and capable of inflicting serious 
harm. See CUFFoRD STOLL, THE CUCKOO'S EGG (1989) (young German in employ of KGB 
hacked into US defense-related computers). See also Charney & Alexander, supra note 34, at 
931; M.E. Bowman, Is International Law Ready for the Information Age?, 19 FORDHAMINT'L 
L.J. 1935 (1996) (author as Associate General Counsel of theFBI is concerned with attacks on 
National Information Infrastructure (NII)). Naturally, the gravity of a conventional threat can 
also be miscalculated, as when Korean Air Lines 007 entered Soviet air space. 
36. CENTCOM is the unified operational command responsible  for^.^. military forces 
in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean basin. 
37. See Graeme Browning, Hack Attacks, GoV'T EXECUTNE 23 (Aug. 1997). 
38. See Schmitt, supra note 28, at 893 & nn.25-26. As a test of 9,000 DOD computer 
networks, the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) hacked into and took control of 88 
percent of the networks. Only 4 percent of systems operators recognized that they had lost 
control and only 0.2 percent reported the events. See Greg Rattray, The Emerging Global 
Information Infrastructure and National Security, 21-FALLFLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 83-84. 
See also John Elvin, Insight, WASH. m E S ,  Mar. 23, 1998, at 32. 
39. PRIMER, supra note 26, at 8. 
Heinonline - -  37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 9 4 9  1 9 9 8 - 1 9 9 9  
950 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [37:939 
go further and destroy the assailant's infrastructure, e.g., the power and 
telecommunications grids in her city. Removing the human being from 
this decision (ie., leaving it to a computer's automated response 
mechanisms) would likely result in faster but less responsible decisions. 
International law traditionally distinguishes between retorsion and 
reprisal-avaluable distinction that should be retained in the context of 
information operations. Retorsion consists of an unfriendly but legal act 
of force undertaken with retaliatory or coercive p~rpose.~" Reprisals are 
more complicated. They involve acts that are illegal unless they follow 
three steps. First, there must be an illegal act by another state. Second, 
the state intending to effect the reprisal must give the original assailant 
the opportunity to "make right their international wrong."41 Finally, if 
this demand goes unsatisfied, then the attacked party may respond in a 
manner proportional to the original atta~k.4~ 
In the context of IW, the decision to adopt a policy of retorsion or 
reprisal presents serious but not necessarily fatal evidence  problem^?^ 
The likelihood of a camouflaged assault means that the responding party 
has no reasonable expectation that he will be punishing the perpetrator, 
unless he can first trace the assault back to a suspect nation, group, or 
individual. He might limit these forceful responses to those occasions 
when he does trace the assault back to groups or actors already 
suspected of being terrorists. Even then, he may only know that he has 
traced the attack back to a suspect group. He will likely not know for 
sure that he has identified the true assailant. So, he must proceed with 
caution. On-screen warnings are important to put intruders on effective 
notice, although they may be ineffective when intruders gain access 
through back doors, i.e., bypassing entry procedures and access 
protocols available to legitimate Internet traffi~.~" Moreover, reliance 
40. See Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help Under International Law, in NATIONAL 
S E C U ~ L A W  131,132-33 (John Norton Moore et al. eds., 1990). See also LOUIS HENKINET 
K,  INTERNATIONALLAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 579 (3d ed. 1993) ("Retorsion is often an 
'equivalent' act of retaliation in response to an unfriendly act."). 
41. Lillich, supra note 40, at 133. 
42. See id. 
43. Moreover, a vast literature debates whether the U.N. Charter bans retorsion and 
reprisals as impermissible uses of force. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4). Lillich summarizes the 
debate. See Lillich, supra note 40, at 133-36. As long as the response is limited to non-forceful 
measures such as using computer code to neutralize the offending machinery, this issue should 
be avoidable. Lillich concludes the discussion by summarizing a speech by Professor Myres 
McDougal on how to read Article 2(4), "in the absence of collective machinery to protect 
people against attack and deprivation . . . the principle of major purposes requires an 
interpretation which would honor self-help against a prior unlawfulness." Id. at 136. 
44. See PRIMER, supra note 26, at 8. An intruder might enter through a "trap door" of his 
own creation. He could gain initial entry through aTrojan Horse-aprogram which on its face 
has a legitimate purpose but has a hidden, illicit purpose. Note the term's origins in a ruse of 
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upon on-screen warnings could result in an attack upon the innocent 
intermediary. Given these problems, retorsion should be limited to 
shutting down (either temporarily or permanently) the computer system 
believed to be generating the original attack. Retorsion would not 
extend to destroying the power and telecommunications grids in the city 
of the suspected assailant. This would probably exceed the limits of 
action deemed defensive defense. 
Much like retorsion, strictly defensive operations like computer 
security (COMPUSEC) also apply to both military and non-military 
systems. Stock exchanges, corporations, travel and communication 
systems, and educational institutions all rely on the integrity and smooth 
running of their own information systems, much as the military does, 
although the failure would rarely be a matter of life and death. Security 
measures include virus checks, fire-walls, passwords, or simply locking 
the building's front door. U.S. domestic losses to hack attacks were 
estimated at $100,000,000 in 1995?' Estimates for computer fraud of 
all varieties in the United States run to ten billion dollars a yearP6 
Strictly defensive measures must always be applied when protecting 
critical infrastructure. If not, the society risks losing use of its military, 
transportation, communications, or other instrumentalities vital to its 
continued security and well-being. 
In terms of national security, infrastructure is both military and 
civilian. "Infrastructure is the framework of interdependent networks 
and systems comprising identifiable industries, institutions, and 
distribution capabilities that provide a continuous flow of goods and 
services essential to the defense and economic security of the United 
States, the smooth functioning of government at all levels, and society 
as a whole."47 Furthermore "[clertain national infrastructures are so 
vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact 
on the defense or economic security of the United States."48 These 
include telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil storage and 
transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply, 
war. 
45. Browning, supra note 37, at 23. 
46. Charney & Alexander, supra note 34, at 936-37. See NRC, COMPUTERS AT RISK, 
supra note 19; Emilio Jaksetic, Computer Security and Government Lawyers, 43 FED. LAW. 26 
(Jul. 1996). 
47. President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP), Overview 
Briefing, F-3 (June 1997) (visited Mar. 24,1999) ~http:llwwwlpccip.govl>. See also Rattray, 
supra note 38, at 81. But see Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care About Computer 
Crime, 10 HARV. J.L. &TECH. 465 (1997). 
48. Exec. Order No. 13,010,61 Fed. Reg. 138 (1996). 
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emergency services and government  service^.^' Protecting them is vital 
to the well-being of the nation. 
Myriad federal laws and enforcement systems support and 
encourage a strictly defensive defense. Foremost among these laws are 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Wiretap Act, each of which 
defines felonies and  misdemeanor^?^ U.S. law against hacking is 
broad-ranging and appears comprehensive. Section 1029 of Title 18 
generally prohibits fraud and related activity with telecommunications 
access devices. The Computer Fraud and Abuse ~ c t "  is the main 
hacker law, enumerating the types of computer espionage. The act 
prohibits unauthorized access to computer-based financial records, 
unauthorized access to nonpublic computers of a department or agency 
of the United States, unauthorized access to a computer with intent to 
defraud, criminal trespass that results in damage, and trafficking in a 
password. The Wiretap Act makes it unlawful for "any person" to 
intentionally intercept, use, or disclose or endeavor to intercept, use, or 
disclose any wire, oral, or electronic communi~ation.~~ TheWiretap Act 
is subject to several exceptions, most importantly for systems 
ad~ninistrators;~ with consent of a party to the comm~nication;~ or if 
intercepted under a court order?' The agencies charged with 
enforcement responsibility are criminal investigative units of the 
military services, the intelligence community, and the Aside from 
tightening some loopholes, these laws do not appear to need any 
significant modifications at this point-at least insofar as they seek to 
protect U.S. infrastructure from IW attacks. In stark contrast, 
international law is vague and has considerable room for improvement. 
49. see id. 
50. For these citations, the author is indebted to Major Stanley R. Smith's briefing on 
hacker law, before the Legal Aspects of Information Warfare Symposium, Air Force Judge 
Advocate General School, Maxwell AFB, Alabama (Nov. 1-3, 1995). For a more complete 
listing of relevant U.S. law,  SCIENCE APPLICATIONS I TERNATIONALCORPORATION (SAIC) 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS A D NETWORKING SYSTEMS OPERATION, INFORMATION WARFARE: 
LEGAL, REGULATORY, POLICY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ASSURANCE, app. 
B (1995) (United States Code: Annotated Bibliography and Index). Table 2-2-1 of this report 
enumerates the various state computer crime statutes. 
51. 18 U.S.C. $ 1030 (1998). 
52. 18 U.S.C. $ 2511 (1998). 
53. See 18 U.S.C. $251 1(2)(a)(i). 
54. See 18 U.S.C. $ 2511(2)(c). 
55. See 18 U.S.C. $ 2511(2)(a)(ii). 
56. See SAIC, supra note 49, tbl. 2-2-2 (indicating the various jurisdictions for computer 
crimes that occur in this country). When an intruder penetrates a Federal system in the U.S. 
with criminal intent, the act falls under the jurisdiction of the FBI and the U.S. Secret Service. 
When the intruder's intent is espionage, then the FBI shares jurisdiction with the National 
Security Agency. See id. 
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Despite the challenges in applying it, discrimination between 
military and civilian targets remains imperative in the age of 
IW-notwithstanding the new difficulties of distinguishing legitimate 
targets within the critical infrastructure. The Geneva Conventions of 
1949 memorialized the basic ground rules for warfare.57 The 1977 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions established the "Basic Rule" on 
discrimination which remains valid, if somewhat more difficult to apply 
to the facts of IW. "In order to ensure respect for and protection of the 
civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall 
at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants 
and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly 
shall direct their operations only against military  objective^."^^ Article 
57. "In view of the large number of states parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 
status which the Conventions have acquired in the international community, it is reasonable to 
assume that the Conventions are (at least in large part) declaratory of customary international 
law." Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 170. 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions are comprised of: (1) Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in theField, opened 
for signature Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 31 14,75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 
I]; (2) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12,1949,6 U.S.T. 
3217,75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 111; (3) Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 1111; (4) Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 
3516.75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
See also Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 2444, U.N. 
G.A.O.R., 23rd Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 50, U.N. Doc. A17218 (1968) (affirming these general 
principles: (a) that the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is 
not unlimited; (b) that it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian populations as such; 
and (c) that distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities 
and members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as 
possible). General Assembly resolutions are recommendations that can become law when 
accepted by the international community. See THE LAWS OF WAR: A COMPREHENSIVE 
C O U E ~ O N O F P ~ A R Y  DOCUMENTS ONINTERNATIONALLAWS GOVERNING ARMED CONFLICT, 
at xxii (Michael Reisman & Chris T. Antoniou eds., 1994). 
58. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 
Dec. 12, 1977, art. 48., 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1979) [hereinafter Protocol I]. "Although the U.S. 
military takes the position that an attacker should accept some responsibility to minimize 
collateral civilian casualties," the United States has not ratified Protocol I because it shifts the 
burden to segregate civilians from military objectives to the attacker from its traditional 
situation where the defender carried this obligation. Danielle L. Infeld, Note, Precision-guided 
Munitions Demonstrated Their Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert Storm; but Is a Country Obligated 
to Use Precision Technology to Minimize Collateral Civilian Injury and Damage?, 26 GEO. 
WASH. J. INT'LL. & ECON. 109,123 (1992). 
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5 1 protects civilian populations, and 5 l(4) defines unlawfully 
indiscriminate attacks as: 
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which 
cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or (c) those 
which employ a method or means of combat the effects of 
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and 
consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike 
military objectives and civilians without distincti~n.~~ 
Even read within the context of Protocol 1's Part IV on Civilian 
Population, this may appear to be self-reflective or even meaningless 
protection, but it has been given flesh. As the International Court of 
Justice6' recently held, this regime does not by itself preclude operations 
that have a secondary or collateral impact on civilians as long as the 
intended target is an armed force or other military ~bjective.~' 
The Protocol's Article 43 expands on the basic rule. 
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized 
armed forces, groups and units which are under a command 
responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, 
even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority 
not recognized by an adverse Party.62 
These are the parties for whom the prohibitions apply, prohibiting them 
from using force to harm nonmilitary objectives and acknowledging 
them as legitimate targets for lawful attacks. Article 52(2) then defines 
military objectives as those objects "which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
59. Protocol I, supra note 58, art. 51. 
60. 'The International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague has long had certain limited 
roles in respect of implementation of the laws of war. . . [but its] statute, with its built-in 
limitations on what types of cases may be brought to it and by whom, is likely to mean that it 
only will have to look at a minority of issues concerning the laws of war." Adam Roberts, The 
Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT'LL. 1 l,43 (1995). 
61. See Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 35 
LL.M. 809 (I.C.J. 1996). 
62. Protocol I, supra note 58, art. 43. 
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circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military ad~antage."~~ 
These legal definitions, however, only lead to consideration of the 
questions, not the answers. Distinguishing legitimate targets still 
requires a context with which to test the facts. 
The traditional tools for distinguishing civilian from military 
personnel or operators are not as readily available as they were before 
the advent of long-range bombardment and  telecommunication^.^^ 
During the three centuries between 1648 and 1945, combatants 
generally wore uniforms that visibly distinguished them from 
noncombatants before the engagement.65 Likewise, most warfare 
involved physical proximity. Whether using edge weapons or 
projectiles, most combatants could see each other and distinguish 
combatants from noncombatants. The major exception here is aerial 
bombardment by airplane or missile. Even then, those soldiers doing 
the targeting still bore the burden of making realistic distinctions-an 
obligation unfortunately honored only in the breach.66 
Whether they are wearing military uniforms or not is 
inconsequential when the parties cannot see each other. The person 
launching a computer virus to attack an American military 
communications system, for example, might be sitting in the basement 
63. Id. art. 52(2). The definition is emphasized by the U.S. Navy. See U N ~ E D  STATES, 
DEPARTMENT OFTHE NAVY, OFFICE OFTHE CHIEFOFNAVALOPERATIONS, THE COMMANDER'S 
HANDB~~K~NTHELAW~FNAVALOPERATIONS, NWP 9, 'j[ 8.1.1 (Supp. July 1987) [hereinafter 
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK], cited in Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 5 n.11. 
64. Distinguishing civilians from military personnel has traditionally been a matter of 
recognizing the military professionalism which has organized the officer corps of the western 
powers since the early nineteenth century. See SAMUELHUNTINGTON, SOLDIER ANDTHE STATE 
(1957). Still, uniformed soldiers fighting others organized into particular standing units that 
had trained and been armed together goes back to at least the end of thel'hirty Years War, when 
rulers and people alike recoiled from the horror of unbridled warfare where distinctions between 
combatants and noncombatants had disintegrated. See Michael Howard, Constraints on 
Warfare, in LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 4 ('The nightmare days of the Thirty Years War 
when troops, themselves desperate and starving, tortured, slaughtered, and burned their way 
across Europe were not prolonged into the following century."). See also Howard's classic, 
MICHAEL HOWARD, WAR IN EUROPEAN HISTORY ch. 2 (1976). 
65. Technically this has been true only for professional or conscription armies. The 
combatants of the colonized world (Le., the indigenous peoples of the Americas, Africa, Asia 
and the Pacific) did not usually wear recognizable uniforms. This cultural difference between 
the imperial powers and the colonized wo;ld only fed the cultural, religious, geo-political, and 
economic forces that undermined the constraints on warfare whin it was between cultures. That 
is to say, the restraints on the western way of war usually did not apply in conflicts between 
Western Europeans and the rest of the world. See Howard, supra note 64, at 5,8. 
66. See Tami Davis Biddle, Air Power, in LAWS OFWAR, supra note 4, at 152-54; David 
Alan Rosenberg, Nuclear War Planning, in LAWS OF WAR, supra note 4, at 165-66. See 
generally W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 89-168 (1990). 
During the inter-war period, the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare "were regarded as an 
authoritative attempt to clarify and formulate rules of air warfare. . . ." Roberts & Guelff, supra 
note 6, at 121. 
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of a publicly traded telephone company wearing a nun's habit. Instead 
of a military uniform, she would be wearing the symbol of clergy-a 
protected group, and she would be sitting in a privately owned building 
also doubly protected by being private and vital to the well-being of 
society. Even assuming she is indeed a nun and not an impostor, she 
would nonetheless also be a combatant subject to a proportional 
response, such as the destruction of her own computer or the local area 
network. In IW, there is no physical proximity to permit distinguishing 
combatants from non-combatants visually. Moreover, in IW, she would 
be a combatant and subject to proportional response. In fact, if the 
target of her attack did not have the means to respond with his own IW 
measures, he could reasonably bomb the building in which she is 
believed to be sitting-again a proportional response but one that 
returns kinetic destruction for that created by electronic 
communications. 
Despite these differences, three traditional principles remain 
valuable for discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate targets: 
military necessity, humanity, and chivalry. Under customary 
international law, military planners must balance all three.67 Under U.S. 
law, military officers must be taught to grapple with these issues.68 
These three principles are also used for determining proportionality and 
are, thus, critical for the legitimate undertaking of IW. 
First, the principle of military necessity demands that "[olnly that 
degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of arrned 
conflict, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy 
with a minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources may 
be applied."69 Moreover, military necessity is an especially complicated 
67. "Customary law is found in the practice of states, how many is not precisely stated, . 
. . which is binding upon all persons of international law irrespective of treaty commitments." 
HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL H U M A N ~ T ~  LAW: THE REGULATION OF ARMED 
CONFLICTS 192 (1990). The United States is bound by customary international law. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES $ 102 (1987); 
Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984). 
68. U.S. Dep't of Defense, DOD Law of War Program, DOD Directive 5100.77 (1979). 
See also Almond, The Teaching and Dissemination of the Geneva Conventions and 
International Humanitarian Law in the United States, 31 AM. U.  L. REV. 981 (1982). 
Nonetheless, when I served on the faculty of the United States Air War College in 1995-1996, 
fulfillment of this requirement seemed to havelapsed from the core cumculum. When I pointed 
this out, a leading JAG lawyer was brought in for a mandatory lecture. Apparently, since my 
departure, the War College has allowed this program to lapse again. 
69. COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 63. See also OFFICE OFTHEJUDGE ADVOCATE 
GENERAL, DEP'T OFTHE NAVY, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK 
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 1 5.2 (1989), cited in WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., 
CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OFFORCE: INFORMATION OPERATIONS, THE LAWS OF WAR AND THE 
UNITED STATES STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, at L-13 (1987). 
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argument in an era of one superpower. The United States has at its 
disposal a vastly greater variety of military and political tools than any 
other state, past or present. For the United States, therefore, military 
necessity often cannot mean that an act is strictly necessary. For the 
foreseeable future at least, there will almost always exist alternatives 
that could not reasonably be measured against each other (i.e., 
conventional or information operations, economic or diplomatic 
sanctions, etc.). Moreover, only one state could plausibly threaten the 
existence of the United States. Notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. 
has a variety of options in most scenarios, questions of military 
necessity in IW do not seem different from those involved in deciding 
whether to undertake traditional operations. Instead, they focus more on 
targets and objectives than means. To this extent, IW does not 
substantially alter the decision-making process. 
Second, the IW planner or operator must weigh the humanity of his 
actions. Unnecessary suffering and destruction of humanity must be 
avoided-a principle widely shared and embodied in the Martens 
Clause of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV). "[Tlhe inhabitants and the 
belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles 
of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among 
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the 
public con~cience."~~ No mere precatory overture, the Martens Clause 
is embodied in an article common to each of the four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. They note that the fact of denouncing the Convention 
shall in no way impair the obligations which the Parties to the 
conflict shall remain bound to fulfil by virtue of the principles 
of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established 
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the 
dictates of the public con~cience.~~ 
70. Hague Convention OV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, pmbl. (emphasis added) [hereinafter Hague IV]. 
71. Geneva Convention I, supra note 57, art. 63; Geneva Convention 11, supra note 57, 
art. 62; Geneva Convention In, supra note 57, art. 142; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 57, 
art. 158 (emphasis added). This principle was likewise confirmed by the 1977 GenevaProtocol 
I, see supra note 58, art. 1; the 1977 Geneva Protocol 11, see Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11), opened for signature Apr. 10,1981, pmbl., 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 
(1979) [hereinafter Protocol 111; and the 1981 UN Weapons Convention, see Convention on 
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be 
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, opened for signature 
Apr. 10,1981, pmbl, 19 I.L.M. 1523 (1980). See also Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 4 & 
n.8. 
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The law of humanity also restrains armed conflict in U.S. LOAC?2 
As with military necessity, humanity in armed conflict is a relative 
value. It might favor an IW operation, for example, when the only 
military alternative is dropping a large explosive on or near the same 
target. On the other hand, it might halt an information attack that would 
disable the computers controlling not only air defense but also civilian 
aviation or an automated subway system. Clearly, humanitarian 
principles prohibit acts justified solely by the Sherman-esque logic that 
"war is cruelty . . . the crueller it is, the sooner it will be over."73 The 
principle of humanity appears to argue in favor of applying information 
operations if the alternatives threaten greater physical destruction and 
loss of life. 
Third, IW planners and operators remain bound by the enduring, if 
amorphous, principles of chivalry. In many societies this might mean 
distinguishing between male and female targets, despite the various 
treaties and national laws banning distinctions based on sex alone.74 
Leaving aside distinctions based on sex, chivalry still protects the 
young, old, and helpless even beyond the consideration given all 
noncombatants. Chivalry also bans treachery or perfidy. The 1977 
Geneva Protocol I bans "[alcts inviting the confidence of an adversary 
to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, 
protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, with intent to betray that confidence . . . .''75 Perfidy includes: 
1) feigning of intent to negotiate or surrender, 2) feigning incapacitation, 
3) feigning civilian, noncombatant status, and 4) feigning protected 
status by use of signs or uniforms of the UN or neutral states. On the 
other hand, ruse of war is not prohibited, which requires drawing yet 
72. See COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 63,952; AIR FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE 
GENERAL SCHOOL, MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW 580 (1994). 
73. HERMAN HATHAWAY &ARCHER JONES, HOW THE NORTH WON 548 (1983). While 
U.S. Civil War general William T. Sherman is renowned for having made a military strategy of 
this notion, he is far from alone in history. See, e.g., Harold Selesky, Colonial America, in 
LAWS OFWAR,supra note4, at 61 (the British conquerors of Ireland justified their atrocities as 
expedient); Biddle, supra note 66, at 147 & n.23-24,29,34,36 (strategic air power theorists 
believed that bombing civilians would destabilize the enemy society and economy, eventually 
toppling the state). Even the vaunted Lieber Code includes a strand of this now-outlawed logic. 
SeeLieber Code, supra note 12, art. XXXIX ('The more vigorously wars are pursued, the better 
it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief."). 
74. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,1966, art. 2.1, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, art. 2.2., 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 180 (XXXIV), (1979), 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980). 
75. Protocol I, supra note 58, art. 37. For the obligations of chivalry, see also 
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 63, ¶ 5.1. 
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another fine distinction under sometimes urgent  circumstance^.^^ 
Legitimate ruses include camouflage, decoys, mock operations, and 
misinformation. 
In a contemporary conflict, application of these chivalric principles 
may seem daunting. However, the differences now are more about 
cultural change than about the employment of particular weapons 
systems. Military strategist Edward Luttwak believes chivalry is no 
longer relevant because it is an atavistic throw-back to a more romantic 
era of warfare.77 Yet, while chivalry may seem archaic today, it retains 
some normative value. While neither courts nor legislatures have 
spoken on this issue, analogy strongly weighs against sending a logic 
bomb disguised as e-mail from the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) or even from "Microsoft Software Support"-where such 
a message might be permissible without perfidious  label^?^ Using 
ICRC and Microsoft tags would constitute an illegitimate act of perfidy, 
much as would disguising any dangerous military intruder in the form 
of an innocuous invitee. Chivalry does not, however, appear to ban 
many other types of clandestine entry into an opponent's system, for 
instance, through trap doors, or by camouflaged instructions from an 
ally. 
In many instances, chivalry may not weigh heavily in the decision 
over whether to undertake IW, if only because the penalty for 
underestimating chivalry is not likely to be applied unless the 
perpetrator loses the war and the evidence and forum exist to convict her 
of a war crime. It is difficult to imagine a realistic penalty for the 
espionage-like offense of gaining access to a computer by pretending to 
be one of the penetrated party's own military personnel. Traditionally 
a spy may be executed if local law but if she returns home, 
then she is safe from prosecution for espionage.80 In IW, spying may 
76. See Protocol I, supra note 58, art. 37 $5 1-2; Hague IV, supra note 70, art. 24. See 
also AIR FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL SCHOOL, supra note 72, at 581. 
77. See Edward N .  Luttwak, Toward Post-Heroic War$are, FOREIGN AFE (MayIJune 
1995). 
78. See Protocol I, supra note 58, art. 38; see also P ~ E R ,  supra note 26, at 17-18; 
Richard Aldrich, The International Legal Implications of Information War$are, AIRPOWER J.
108 (Fall 1996). A logic bomb functions like a virus that could selectively degrade or even 
destroy the computer hosting it. 
79. Hague IV, supra note 70, art. 29 states: "A person can only be considered a spy when, 
acting clandestinely or on false pretenses, he obtains or endeavours to obtain information in the 
zone of operations of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party." 
Article 30 requires merely that a "spy taken in the acts shall not be punished without previous 
trial." The Geneva Convention IV, governing suspected spies in occupied temto~y, merely 
requires a fair trial. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 57, pt. I, art. 5. 
80. For similar treatment in time of war, see Hague IV, supra note 70, art. 31. 
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occur from the safety of a windowless office in Fort Meade or Shaw 
AFEi, headquarters of the National Security Agency and the Air Force's 
IW center, respectively. The spy is already home and already safe. 
Chivalry, therefore, will play only a minor role in IW. 
While it is important to weigh military necessity, humanity, and 
chivalry, some categories of outright impermissible activities present 
themselves in the area of IW. "The right of belligerents to adopt means 
of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."" Nonetheless, the planner may 
still balance these three principles to decide whether the targets are 
protected by international law. At one extreme are legitimate 
targets-military objectives such as army bases, ships of war, weapons 
depots, and intelligence headquarters. That is not to say that these may 
all be destroyed for any or no reason. The principles of jus ad bellurn, 
proportionality, military necessity, chivalry, and humanity continue to 
constrain the treatment of enemy combatants and other military 
objectives. At the other extreme of the spectrum are those objectives 
that are strongly protected by international law, such as religious, 
cultural, and medical facilities. Between these per se categories, there 
remains a large intermediate area where reasonableness demands 
weighing military necessity, humanity, and chivalry as well as 
proportionality. As with conventional war planning, info-warriors must 
consider the per se categories and also the more questionable targets. 
For nearly a century, certain categories of objects have been beyond 
the reach of lawful attack. The Hague Convention on Land Warfare 
(1907) requires that: 
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken 
to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, 
science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, 
and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided 
they are not being used at the time for military  purpose^.'^ 
However, to prevent the rule from being abused to protect otherwise 
legitimate targets, the convention further demands segregation. "It is 
the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings or 
places by distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the 
81. Id. art. 22. 
82. Hague IV, supra note 70, art. 27. 
Heinonline - -  37 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 960 1 9 9 8 - 1 9 9 9  
19991 DISCRIMINATION IN INFORMATION WARFARE 961 
enemy bef~rehand."'~ These specially protected objects include civilian 
hospitals, cultural, historical, or religious sites, reservoirs of dangerous 
forces (including dams and nuclear power plants), food and other 
supplies necessary for human life.'" 
During the most recent large-scale international armed conflict, the 
Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, Iraq abused these constraints. Among 
other transgressions, the Iraqi leadership hid military intelligence 
operations beneath children's milk processing plants and placed military 
aircraft amidst cultural artifacts." President Saddam Hussein had 
constructed dozens of statues of himself that were placed among 
otherwise legitimate targets. This left planners with the dilemma of 
deciding if the statues were "cultural property" deserving the protection 
of the Convention. With each of these acts, Hussein flouted his 
obligation as a defender to segregate military from civilian objectives. 
In other words, Hussein abused the laws of war, casting the legitimate 
activities of the Allies in a light of illegitimacy before the CNN court of 
world opinion. In the future, these cynical games may undermine a 
state's willingness to risk its own forces in order to adhere to the 
principle of discrimination as between legitimate and illegitimate 
targets. 
Nonetheless, responsible states should continue to try to restore 
discrimination and the defender's obligation to segregate. IW may 
facilitate this restoration, or at least make it easier. For instance, if 
undertaken cautiously, IW may allow a state to disable certain targets 
that would be protected from more destructive forms of attack. Thus, 
a state actor could possibly attack information systems within protected 
sites with an impact that may not rise to the level of destruction that the 
conventions prohibit. An IW attack could disable an Iraqi intelligence 
center, instead of using 2,000-pound bombs to destroy it and the 
children's shelter beneath it. Likewise, destroying a dam is generally 
83. Id. Because these provisions failed to protect cultural property in World War 11, a 
stronger convention was sought by the international community. The result was the Hague 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 
1954,249 U.N.T.S. 240-88 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Conv.]. The principles it embodies were 
most recently affirmed in Protocol I, supra note 58, art. 53 and Geneva Protocol 11, supra note 
71, art. 16. This "special protection may be viewed as a part of customary international law." 
Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 340. 
84. See Hague IV, supra note 70, art. 27; 1954 Hague Conv., supra note 83, at 240. To 
receive this protection, however, cultural property must be "situated at an adequate distance 
from any large industrial centre or from any important military objective constituting a 
vulnerable point . . . [and] are not used for military purposes." Id. art. 8(l)(a)-(b), at 246. 
85. Iraq purposefully located legitimate military targets near its civilian population, 
civilian objects, and cultural property. See U.S. DEP'TOFDEFENSE, CONDUCr OFTHE PERSIAN 
GULFWAR:FINALREPORTTOCONGRESS 125-26, app. 0, at 0-14 (1992); Infeld, supra note 58, 
at 137. 
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prohibited by Protocol I.86 But temporarily disabling the dam's 
electronic control system would not be prohibited if doing so does not 
unleash a torrent or deprive civilians of water for the purpose of denying 
them sustenance. The Protocol seeks to avoid the horror of unleashing 
dangerous forces in a way that would harm civilians. It does not seek 
to ban outright the denial of a dam's energy or even of its water to an 
enemy. Here IW would be a more flexible and useful tool than 
explosives which would likely release the deadly forces--or 
permanently deprive the civilians of drinking water. 
Likewise, IW might enable an operator to disengage a regional 
electric grid temporarily where he would be prohibited from destroying 
it. The Hague regime prohibits the "attack or bombardment, by 
whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are 
undefended. . . ."87 This does not mean that an information warrior can 
attack a village's power grid or telecommunications network 
intentionally, justified merely by the fact that the grid or network has 
some electronic defenses." However, because the village's 
infrastructure is tied into a regional or national network that is defended 
by the military, it may be damaged as the collateral effect to an 
information strike on a military target. This impact, however, is likely 
to be far less serious under an IW attack which puts it out of 
commission temporarily, compared to an explosion that would kill 
people and cause damage requiring more money, time, and resources to 
86. 'Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear 
electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects 
are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent 
severe losses among the civilian population." Protocol I, supra note 58, art 56(1). TheProtocol 
does makelimited exceptions for those works being used "for other than [their] normal function 
and in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only 
feasible way to terminate such support. . . ." Id. art. 56(2)(a). 
Additionally, the Protocol makes it prohibited to "attack, destroy, remove, or render 
useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population . . . for the specific 
purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse 
Party, whatever the motive. . . ." Id. art. 54(2). 
87. Hague IV, supra note 70, art. 25. See also Hague Draft Rules on Aerial Warfare, arts. 
22-26, reprinted in 32 AM. J. INT'LL. 12 (Supp. 1938), Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 121, 
126-28. 
88. "Customary practice has been that military equipment such as units and bases, and 
economic targets such as power sources, industry, transportation, and command and control 
centers, are always legitimate targets. This includes transportation and communications 
systems. However, 'the inherent nature of an object is not controlling; its value to the enemy 
or the perceived value of its destruction is the determinant.' Even traditional civilian objects, 
such as private homes, if used for military purposes, may be attacked. The important factor is 
to determine if the target makes an effective contribution to the enemy's military operations; if 
it does, it is subject to attack, whereverlocated, even if within heavily populated areas." Infeld, 
supra note 58, at 122 (citations omitted); see also UNEED STATES DEPARTMENT OFTHE AIR 
FORCE, AN INTRODUCI~ON TO AIR FORCE TARGETING, AFP 200-17, at 9 (1989)). 
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repair. Thus, IW might permit operations against targets that are 
generally protected by international conventions. In doing so, it would 
not undermine those agreements but rather would strengthen them by 
aligning military means to their desired outcomes. 
As noted above, in order to protect civilians and civilian objects, the 
defender must not thwart the intent of the principle of discrimination; 
he has an obligation to segregate them from military objectives. 
Protocol I requires that: "to promote the protection of the civilian 
population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are 
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an 
attack."89 This obligation is relatively straightfonvard in naval combat 
where armed forces move by military vessels alone. At home, however, 
states rely on their civilian infrastructure almost entirely to move large 
numbers of troops; highways, railroads, and frequently airports are not 
duplicated by solely military systems. Moreover, where armed forces 
once communicated among themselves-via military media such as 
couriers, runners, pigeons, walkie-talkie, or unsecured telegraph or 
telephone lines-they now share the info-sphere with civilians 
everywhere. In IW, segregation presents many new challenges. 
In the information age, military operations are increasingly reliant 
upon advanced communications; information and critical infrastructure 
are shared, frequently gutting the defender's reasonable ability to 
segregate the military from the civilian.'' Modern military forces rely 
on mixed-use telecommunications media, including telephones, faxes, 
and e-mail, that travel over the civilian-owned or operated networks. 
Even with the unmatched material wealth of the United States, DOD 
telecommunications relies heavily on public networks.'' If the 
wealthiest nation does not have the resources to segregate its command 
and control systems from the civilian communications network, then 
one would not expect the remainder of the world to do so. 
Deciding whether to destroy civilian communications systems, 
therefore, requires careful balancing. However, the scale has never 
89. Protocol I, supra note 58, art. 44(3). Recall also Protocol I, article 48's Basic Rule: 
"In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the 
Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants ar;d between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct 
their operations only against military objectives." (emphasis added to show that the burden falls 
both on attacker and defender). 
90. 'Warfare is no longer primarily a function of who puts the most capital labor, and 
technology on the battlefield, but of who has the best information about the battlefield." 
Arquilla & Ronfeldt, supra note 19, at144. 
91. This despite the military origins of the ARPANETnnternet. 
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clearly materialized. If the measure is lives saved, then IW offers great 
possibilities for-expanding the realm of legitimate targets, because it 
enables operators to target systems for quiet disablement rather than 
explosive destruction. To this extent, patterns of legitimate usage 
should develop as they have for other precision weapons such as laser- 
or GPS-guided munitions. The USAF apparently believes the correct 
legal formula for planning should be that the attack must be likely to 
produce a military advantage that outweighs the civilian casualties and 
damage." This demands weighing the importance of' navigation 
systems, communications systems, and electrical grid systems to the 
opponent's military effort.93 The balancing process appears to beg the 
question of how to value these systems. Does one measure in lives 
saved or lost; dollars spared, saved, risked; or only in permanent 
physical destruction? IW offers a theoretical opportunity that 
conventional weapons do not; degrading a system could be more readily 
reversible in ways that physical destruction could not. This means that 
lives could be saved while the systems become inoperative, either 
permanently or briefly. Does this therefore mean that reversible attacks 
will be launched against civilians or civilian infrastructure more freely? 
Maybe. Does IW strengthen adherence to the norms of discrimination? 
If the goal is to protect civilian lifestyles as much as possible during the 
operation, then the answer is "no." If the aim is to contain war's 
destructiveness and to facilitate restoration of civil society after the 
conflict, then the answer is "quite probably yes." - 
IV. A MODEL PROTOCOL 
To announce the fact that the laws of war continue to apply, an 
international legal convention guiding the conduct of information 
operations would be extremely valuable. Rather than creating new 
rules, the convention would work best if it codified customary 
international law and applied some of the facts to the existing 
constraints on warfare.94 Such a protocol might read in relevant part: 
92. Writing in an unofficial capacity, Colonel Owen E. Jensen states: "Cut or deny all the 
enemy's information-transfer media-telephone, radio frequencies 0, cable, and other means 
of transmission. Sever the nervous system. Deny, disrupt, degade, or destroy every 
transmission." Col. Owen E. Jensen, Infonnation Warfare: Principles of Third-Wave War, 8 
Arrrpow~ J. 35,37 (Winter 1994). Colonel Jensen is not a lawyer. See also Aldrich, supra 
note 78, at 105-09. 
93. See PRIMER, supra note 26, at 18. 
94. Among others, Robert and Guelff note that "[t]echnological developments in the 
methods of conducting war have increased the extent to which the written law is inadequate or 
absent." Roberts & Guelff, supra note 6, at 15. 
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1. In deciding whether and how to undertake military 
information operations, each Party agrees to balance the 
principles of: (a) military necessity; (b) proportionality; and 
(c) discrimination. . . . 
.... 
(c) In discriminating between military objectives and 
impermissible targets, each Party agrees to balance 
humanity, chivalry, and the likelihood that the objectives 
could be achieved without physical destruction. 
2. Ratification of this convention confers jurisdiction under the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) war crimes clause and, 
failing that, to ad hoc international or regional courts vested 
with appropriate jurisdiction. 
The proposal is crafted to circumvent some unstated problems. First, 
the proposed protocol would apply only to state parties, in an era when 
many transnational aggressors are not states. This makes sense with the 
framework of most humanitarian law, which currently applies only to 
states. States remain the fundamental units of the international system. 
As non-governmental organizations and groups gain political and legal 
recognition in the global (i.e., not merely "international") system, then 
they, too, could sign and become parties. In that eventuality, this 
protocol, like Protocol I, would protect non-state actors as well as state 
parties. 
Second, the proposed protocol does not contain a definition of an 
information operation. Instead of defining "military information 
operations," the ICC (or the ad hoc judicial system) could build a body 
of case law that would allow for more flexible, fact- and context- 
sensitive interpretations much as has been done with crimes against 
humanity or the ''just following orders" defense?' Because states 
voluntarily submit to a court's jurisdiction, they could opt out if the case 
law develops unfairly or in a way that they find disagreeable. That 
would not, however, halt the creation of new customary international 
law and eventually jus cogens. Should the day come when people can 
agree upon a definition, it could be added by judicial interpretation, in 
a dispute or in an advisory opinion. 
Third, the model protocol avoids the potential evidentiary problems 
in a way that may compel those who undertake information operations 
to document their efforts to fight fairly. Such a requirement will 
95. See Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the 
Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J .  TRANSNAT'LL. 787 (1999). 
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reinforce caution. In addition, computer systems for tracing and 
tracking a user's keystrokes are increasingly capable-a trend likely to 
continue as long as commercial users can profit from research about 
their customers. 
Fourth, the principles of humanity and chivalry are very difficult to 
judge as between societies of different cultures. This problem is central 
to the laws of war in general. However, inter-societal conflict 
frequently involves problems of cultural insensitivity; this is not an 
argument for abandoning efforts to generate and encourage global 
norms constraining conflict. 
Finally, like Protocol I, the model protocol does not mention a duty 
on the defender to segregate military from non-military objectives. 
Acknowledging the insurmountable economic obstacles to creating 
redundant military infrastructure, this convention would shift most of 
the burden of discrimination to the attacker. This might well result in 
hindering the development of IW capabilities-a reasonable outcome. 
On the other hand, the court would have the discretion to decide when 
the defender unjustly placed its civilians or civilian infrastructure in 
harm's way. 
Discrimination remains critical to the legitimate use of force in the 
information age. LOAC is facing some of its greatest challenges in 
keeping up with astounding technological changes. The capacity to 
compute, communicate, and store information doubles every year or 
two. LOAC faces not only many challenges in the short run but also a 
change in the nature of warfare that is more dramatic than any in the 
past two millennia. Still, the principles of military necessity, humanity, 
and chivalry provide valuable limitations. Diligent, creative, and 
intelligent application of these principles should see LOAC well into the 
twenty-first century. An IW protocol and resort to the proposed ICC 
should help. 
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Am 
APC 
ARPANET 
CENTCOM 
COMPUSEC 
c3 
CIA 
DISA 
DOD 
EMP 
FBI 
GA 
ICC 
ICRC 
I.L.M. 
Iw 
JAG 
KGB 
LOAC 
NRC 
NSA 
PCCIP 
RF 
SAlC 
SIGINT 
U.N.T.S. 
USA 
USAF 
USN 
USAF Air Force Base 
Armored Personnel Carrier 
DOD7s Advanced Research Projects Agency-funded progenitor to 
the Internet. 
Central Command 
Computer Security 
Command, Control, and Communications 
Central Intelligence Agency 
DOD Defense Information Systems Agency 
Department of Defense 
Electro-magnetic pulse (used in this Note to refer to non-nuclear 
explosion created EMP) 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
United Nations General Assembly 
International Criminal Court (proposed) 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
International Legal Materials, American Society of International 
Law 
Information Warfare 
Judge Advocate General 
Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopastnosti (Committee for State 
Security, USSR) 
Law of Armed Conflict 
National Research Council 
National Security Agency 
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Radio frequencies 
Science Applications International Corporation 
Signals Intelligence-information derived from intercepting 
electromagnetic (radio) waves 
United Nations Treaty Series 
United States Army 
United States Air Force 
United States Navy 
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